Introduction
Empirical analysis of household expenditure has, traditionally, been based on the unitary model that assumes that family members maximise a single utility function. The assumption of common preference ordering among family members can be traced to Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1981) . The unitary model has been increasingly challenged in recent years through attempts at modelling individual utility to incorporate the divergent and conflicting preferences of different family members. Examples include the cooperative bargaining models [Manser and Brown (1980) , McElroy and Horney (1981) , Moehling (1995) ], the non cooperative bargaining models [Kanbur and Haddad (1994) , Lundberg and Pollak (1994) ], and the "sharing rule" approach based on a Pareto efficient sharing role between household members [Chiappori (1988) , Browning and Chiappori (1998) ]. Crucial to the non unitary models is the relative "power" of individual members in the household [see Pollak (1994) ].
As Basu (2001a) has recently pointed out, a distinctive, perhaps limiting, characteristic of the literature on non unitary models is that the welfare weights assigned to the individual household members are fixed and exogenous to household decision making. To our knowledge, Basu (2001a) is the first attempt at endogenising the welfare weight 1 in a model of intra household behaviour. The present study extends Basu (2001a) in several ways: (i) Basu's framework is generalised to allow a simple test of his assumption that the female's share of adult wage earnings is a correct measure of her bargaining power, (ii) the woman's welfare weight is allowed to depend on the relative educational experience of the woman vis a vis the man, (iii) empirical evidence is presented on the endogenously determined welfare weight, on its variation with female education, and on its impact on household expenditure patterns 2 . The results are particularly significant since there exists little empirical evidence on household behaviour in an intra household model where the welfare weights are endogenously determined and simultaneously estimated with the other behavioural parameters. The significance of the impact of female "power" on expenditure allocation, conditional on all other household characteristics including aggregate household expenditure remaining constant, constitutes a test of the income pooling hypothesis underlying the unitary model [see Maitra and Ray (2000) for an alternative test].
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes the estimation. The results are presented and discussed in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4.
The Intra Household Model with Endogenous Welfare Weights
Let us consider a household with a woman, man and a child. We shall denote these individuals as 1, 2, 3 respectively. Following the "collective approach", the household welfare function is:
where u 1 and u 2 denote, respectively, the individual utilities of the woman and the man, specified as a function of goods and leisure, x. The balance of power in the household, θ ε [0, 1], is dependent on a set of household characteristics, z. As θ increases, the 'power' of the woman increases, and vice versa. The "collective approach" either considers θ to be fixed, or specifies the z variables to be exogenous to the analysis so that θ is also exogenous. The unitary model imposes the restriction of common preferences on (1), i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )
Following Basu (2001a, Section 2), we endogenise θ by allowing the z vector to include choice variables that are also contained in x. To simplify the exposition, let us specify the individual utilities to be functions of leisure hours, i.e. l 1 , l 2 , l 3 which are, respectively, the leisure hours of the man, woman and the child. The individual utilities are specified as
The assumption made here is that, while the woman and the man do not care for each other's leisure, they both care for the "leisure" of their child (l 3 ) which includes time spent on her/his schooling. The household's welfare maximisation problem can, therefore, be written as: 
Note that the utilities are decreasing in labour hours.
We specify the female power variable as follows:
where z i = w i e i is adult earnings (i = 1, 2) and ed 1 , ed 2 denote, respectively, the years of schooling of the most educated adult female and male members of the household. Eqn (5) allows, via φ < 1, for the female's share of adult earnings to be an understatement of her true "power" in the household, and for an overstatement if φ > 1. Eqn (5a) allows, via φ 1 , the female power parameter, φ, to depend on the relative educational experiences of the woman and the man. Note, therefore, that a test of φ 0 = 1, φ 1 = 0 constitutes a test of Basu (2001a) 's assumption that the female's share of adult earnings is a correct measure of her bargaining power.
Let us choose the following simple functional forms for u 1 , u 2 :
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After routine manipulation, the welfare maximisation exercise yields the following estimable female and male earnings equations, expressed as a share of total household earnings, E = (w 1 e 1 + w 2 e 2 + w 3 e 3 ): 
where 0 e , 0 e 2 2 1
denote the responsiveness of the female's bargaining power to female and male labour hour s, respectively. In conventional treatments of the "collective" model,
The empirical exercise employs a two stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the female power function parameters (φ 0 , φ 1 ), along with utility function parameters (ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) by applying nonlinear SUR on equations (7a, 7b). Using the estimated values of φ 0 and φ 1 , we then generate via eqns. (5, 5a) the female power variable, θ. The second stage involves estimating, using 3SLS, the following set of simultaneous equations -the (N -1) independent budget share equations (bs i , N being the number of items), the total per capita expenditure (tpc) equation, and the female power (θ) equation, with bs i (i = 1,…, N-1), tpc and θ being treated as jointly endogenous.
Note in particular that we have allowed for the dependence of the "female power" variable, θ, on, among others, the household's aggregate expenditure variable, tpc. Note also the joint and mutual dependence of commodity demand (bs i ), aggregate expenditure (tpc) and female power (θ), via
where n denotes the vector of household compositional variables, and d, r denote the characteristics of the household's region of residence. To simplify estimation, we assume linear functional forms in eqns. (8a) -(8c).
Data and Results
The data on child labour comes from the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) conducted 7a, 7b) . With the exception of ρ 3 , all of the other parameter estimates are well determined and highly significant. The ρ 1 , ρ 2 estimates show that the magnitude of the negative impact of male labour hours on his utility (ρ 2 ) is higher than that of female labour hours on her utility or welfare (ρ 1 ). The estimates of φ 0 , φ 1 convincingly reject the joint hypothesis: φ 0 = 1, φ 1 = 0 ie., that the wage earnings distribution between the woman and the man is an accurate measure of their bargaining power. The φ 0 estimate of 0.889 suggests that the woman's share of adult wage earnings is an understatement of her true bargaining power, while the φ 1 estimate shows that the magnitude of this understatement increases with an increase in the woman's educational experience vis a vis that of the man. Table 2 reports the results of the 3SLS estimates of the equation system (8a) -(8c). The φ parameter estimates used in the 3SLS estimation, reported in Table 2 , assumes φ 1 = 0 (see eqn.
(5a)). The qualitative results are robust to the relaxation of this assumption (see footnote of Figure   1 ). The endogeneity of the female bargaining power variable, θ, is underlined by the significance of most of the household characteristics in the estimated equation (8c). Six features stand out, in particular: (i) the f emale's bargaining power (θ) is significantly and positively affected by the woman's wage rate and negatively by the man's; (ii) the child wage rate has little impact on θ; (iii) women in the rural areas of Nepal have, ceteris paribus, higher bargaining power than their urban counterpart; (iv) the female's bargaining power is highly sensitive to household composition -that is, ceteris paribus, females enjoy greater power in households with more women and older children but less power in households with more men and younger children; (v) a ceteris paribus increase in the female's educational experience leads to a significant increase in her bargaining power inside the household; and (vi) a similar increase in the male's educational experience has an opposite effect.
Of the other results in Table 2 , the ones of particular interest relate to the impact of female power (θ) on the budget shares of the 7 items, and on the household's per capita aggregate expenditure. With the exception of consumer durables, all of the other budget share equations reject the principal testable implication of the unitary model, namely, that the θ, θ 2 variables are jointly insignificant in their impact on the individual budget shares. While θ is significant for aggregate household expenditure, the θ 2 term is not significant. The results also show that the relationship between budget share (bs i ) and the female's bargaining power (θ), while mostly non-linear, varies greatly between items. This is brought out clearly in Figure 1 . Tobacco, for example, is an interesting example of a "private good" which is consumed (almost exclusively) by the adult male in the household. As female power increases, the share of tobacco falls continuously until it reaches a minimum ( ) 7 . 0 ? − whe n it starts to rise again.
The sensitivity of the relation between the budget share and female power is seen more clearly in Figure 2 , which involves a finer (14-good) disaggregation of the food items in a 3SLS reestimation of equations (8a -8c). The 3SLS estimates are available on request. These show [see footnote of Figure 2 ] that eggs and milk, cooking oil, and sweets (both of which are jointly consumed inside the household) do not reject the constancy of budget share with respect to θ and θ 2 which the unitary model implies. Baby milk, which, like tobacco, has the features of a private good in that it is consumed exclusively by a child member, exhibits significantly non-monotonic relationships with respect to θ . Generally, items which have features of a "public good" in that they are consumed by all members (i.e., flour and rice, eggs and milk, and meat) tend to show greater monotonicity than other "privately consumed" items (i.e., baby milk, alcohol, and tobacco). The graphs presented in Figures 1 and 2 do not provide much support to the picture of a horizontal straight line that is implied by the unitary model. The idea of income pooling, underlying the traditional unitary model, with the female weights or bargaining power having no impact on expenditure pattern, has only limited support, mainly from items (eg., consumer durables in Table   2 ) which are jointly consumed inside the household.
Summary and Conclusions
In the unitary model, the identity of the income recipient within the household is irrelevant in traditional analysis of household expenditure. Also, an unequal balance of power between men and women in making household decisions has little consequence for household outcomes.
Consequently, the "power" of individuals in making decisions has attracted little attention in studies of household behaviour. The "collective approach" departs from these restrictive features by expressing household welfare as a weighted sum of individual utilities. However, the weights are considered to be fixed or exogenous to the analysis. One therefore overlooks the possibility that the weights could be altered by the outcomes themselves.
This paper extends the collective approach by proposing and estimating a framework where the weights are endogenised and simultaneously determined with the household's expenditure and earnings decisions. Defining a female's "power" as her endogenously determined welfare weight, the study finds on Nepalese data that the woman's share of household earnings understates her true The statistical significance or otherwise of the impact of female power on an item's budget share provides a convenient test of the income pooling hypothesis underlying the unitary model.
The results provide little evidence in support of income pooling, especially for items which have the characteristics of a "private good" in being primarily consumed by particular household members.
Note, however, that limited support for income pooling does exist for items that are collectively consumed inside the household. The results reveal some interesting non-monotonic relationships between "female power" and budget share that vary a good deal between items. 9.21e -6 (1.36e-6) 9.56e -6 (7.79e-7)
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-7.23e-6 (1.12e-6) (Total Per capita Consumption) functions, respectively, to ensure nonnegative values at each level of female power. While results from the basic 3SLS model for θ (where φ is not dependent on anything) were used to produce the graphs, essentially the same graphs would have resulted from using the extended 3SLS model for θ (where φ = (φ 0 + φ 1 (maxfemed/maxmaled)) since the output for both models was almost exactly the same. All figures were calculated at the mean values for all of the other variables in each equation. Results for consumer durables with respect to θ and θ 2 were not significant, and the coefficient for θ 2 in the total consumption per capita function was not significant. 
